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Abstract
The question of diagnostic phase is still relevant in clinical psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalytical psychotherapies. Orthodox psychoanalysis was not preoccupied 
with the question of diagnostic assessment. The psychoanalyst simply introduced the 
methods and techniques of analysis into his clinical work to determine the analysa-
bility of a patient. The first decisive developmental thrust on specific psychoanalytic 
diagnostic assessment followed the shift to relational theories and clinical practice 
with borderline patients. The Psychiatric Interview introduced by Harry Stack Sullivan 
(1954) exposed the question of the need for a specific psychoanalytic assessment. The 
next step was the development of Hartmann’s Ego-Psychology. The Ego (mechanism 
of regulation between reality and the person), includes the processes of regulating and 
organizing experiences that are particularly relevant to understanding near-psychotic 
and psychotic personalities. Examined as such, it enables the differential descriptive 
interpretative psychodynamic as well as developmental assessment, including the cri-
teria of indication and prognosis.
Key words: Rorschach test, Ego psychology, differential diagnosis, borderline phe-
nomena
The question of diagnostics in psychotherapy came into focus during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century. Even then, every approach introduced an endeavour to 
develop its specific diagnostic system.
Orthodox psychoanalysis was not preoccupied with the question of diagnostic 
assessment, although when Jung introduced “his” test of free associations, he in fact 
adopted Fechner-Galton’s test. Freud (Fine, 1979), rejected the classical medical 
model of disease. During his first period of work, he followed the idea of a causal 
model of understanding neurosis; however, he simply introduced the methods and 
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techniques of analysis into his clinical work to examine the analyzability of a pa-
tient. On that ground (in contrast to psychoses) he differentiated between the “trans-
ference neuroses” accessible to analysis, and “narcissistic neuroses”, inaccessible to 
the analytical process. He was criticized for abandoning the usual psychiatric clas-
sifications, while introducing his own at the same time. This argument leads us to 
the constantly present question of the common points and the differentiation among 
the psychiatric diagnostic categories or clinical-psychological assessment on the 
one hand and specific psychotherapeutic assessment on the other.
Freud’s (1914) denotation of narcissistic neuroses brought a contribution to the 
positive diagnosis (replacing diagnosis “per exclusionem”) of neurosis as the con-
sequence of a repressed infantile conflict residua, compared with “something else”, 
nowadays known as personality disorders or ego-deficient developmental modifica-
tion, typical in borderline personalities. His advanced work on the structural theory 
introduced the assessment of a holistic picture of a personality structure instead of 
a clinical picture of the symptoms. Probably the most important concept, from the 
diagnostic point of view, represents Freud’s idea of the developmental progress 
from the primary to the secondary principle of thinking, the cut-off point among the 
infantile and post-infantile period of mental life.
The first decisive developmental thrust on specific psychoanalytic diagnostic 
assessment followed the shift to relational theories and clinical practice.
Harry Stack Sullivan (1892-1949, 1954), analyzed by Clara Thompson in the 
atmosphere of the Berlin institute tradition, became the key-promoter of “interper-
sonal psychoanalysis”. Along with other immigrants from Berlin, he represents the 
core of the so-called “neo-Freudians” or “neo-Analysts”. Integrating Freud’s drive 
theory with the interpersonal model of thinking, they represent the crucial source 
of the developing theory of object relations. Similarly to Freud (with the theory 
of psychosexual development) or Piaget (in the cognitive developmental theory), 
Sullivan’s developmental approach is organized around specific epochs of develop-
ment introducing the theorem of reciprocal emotion, the condition under which not 
only the personality structure, but also personification (self) is organized. To fol-
low the basic processes influencing the structuring of a personality and organizing 
the personification, Sullivan introduced the method of directed questions, starting 
the treatment with a well-developed directed diagnostic interview. The book “The 
Psychiatric Interview” by Harry Stack Sullivan was edited by his students in 1954, 
five years after his premature death (Barton, 1996). The need for a specific psycho-
analytic assessment was just a question of time.
The next step was the development of Hartmann’s Ego-Psychology. Since Freud 
developed the concept of ego, first as a synonym for the self and second as a self-
preserving mechanism, the ego-functions have been carefully examined. According 
to Hinsie and Campbel (1963), the Ego is part of the psychic apparatus which is the 
mediator between the person and reality; the perception of reality and adaptation to 
it. Hartmann (1964) focused his work on the third aspect of the Ego: mechanisms of 
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regulation between reality and the person, which he called ego apparatuses. These 
have their own maturation and developmental logic from birth according to their 
own timetable and interconnecting with perception, cognitive and motor develop-
ment, organization of sensorimotor intelligence and experience to use the capacity 
for reality testing. In contemporary psychoanalysis (“The Ego is the term psychoa-
nalysis uses to include the aspects of mental functioning that regulate and mediate 
between the experience of reality and the experience of emotions” (Marcus, 1992, 
p.1). It includes the processes of regulating and organizing experiences that are 
particularly relevant to understanding near-psychotic and psychotic personalities.
Kellerman and Burry (1981) introduced the concept of thought organization. 
They connected the assessment possibilities of reality testing with the hierarchical 
model of developmental steps in ego-autonomy, following the model of the psycho-
analytic structural approach.
The primary autonomous ego function is the level where the dispositions of per-
ceptual (relational) functions enable the infant to enter eye-contact and mirroring. 
However, according to Spitz (1965), it is a critical phase (the end of the 2nd month), 
when distinct and gross perceptual distortions may also appear. As a consequence, 
progress may remain impaired in the sense of fragmentation of perception, thinking 
and feeling, including a diminished capacity for appreciation of stimuli in an inte-
grated and coherent manner. Impaired primary autonomy ego function represents 
a strong indicator of a psychotic process reflecting the disintegration of cognitive 
organization. The patient is out of contact with reality.
Secondary autonomous ego function relates specifically to the capacity for di-
rected thought connected to the primary process as seeking pleasure or avoiding 
discomfort. A vital question that we have to examine is to what extent the patient is 
impulse dominated and his or her cognitive organization characterized by propen-
sity for acting-out. Impaired secondary autonomous ego functions may still result 
in demonstrated processes of decompensation and depersonalization in psychotic 
personalities or serious borderline conditions of ego-syntonic behaviour. The im-
pairment of secondary autonomous ego functions can also be found in patients 
with some organic involvement. Thus, any impairment of primary and secondary 
autonomous ego functions may be connected to disturbance in the ego boundary or 
ego integrity typical of psychotic or serious borderline personalities.
Restored integrative ego function represents the milestone where the capacity 
for reality testing and contact are no longer in question. Though the person may 
play around fantasy and reality or even show some difficulties in the regulation of 
drives, impulses or affects, the cognitive organization essentially shows an intact 
ego. Impairment of the integrative function of the ego means that a person, although 
in contact with reality, may from time to time (mostly in specific psychodynamic 
contexts) misapprehend, distort or react in an infantile, defensive manner, typical 
of neurotic personalities.
Synthetic ego function represents a developmental achievement where not only 
reality testing and contact are unquestionably intact. It manifests itself in the suc-
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cessful management of contradictions, ambiguities, uncertainties, in goal oriented 
activities, planning, judgment and commitment. Impaired synthetic function can 
compromise all of these functions and inconsistencies. In reality, conditions are 
channeled into passive compensatory fantasies rather than into active, assertive 
striving.
The most sophisticated level of cognitive function is the adaptive ego function. 
It involves flexible problem solving, creative, inventive and adaptive assimilation 
of unconscious fantasies into actual practice, the comprehension of contradictions 
as integrated bimodal systems. All of these achievements are also reflected in grati-
fying relationships.
Kellerman and Burry (1981) opt for an assessment phase where they rely on 
experience in the use of a flexible semi-structured psychoanalytic interview, but 
also give credit to certain psycho-diagnostic tests. Similarly Kernberg (1975) “has 
spoken to the unique contributions psychological testing can make to diagnosis of 
borderline personality in particular, viewing selective emergence of primary process 
thinking on less structured (projective) psychological tests”.
Rapaport (1957), whose work on the application of a psycho-diagnostic exami-
nation within clinical psychoanalytical diagnosis was very impressive, investigated 
the Rorschach indicators of the primary process thinking or so-called “deviant ver-
balizations” as a dimension of altered (pathologically increased or lost) “distance” 
from the reality task. He found three main categories: non-realistic fabulized com-
binations (i.e. two percepts, combined purely by virtue of the contiguity of the blot 
areas involved), confabulation (i.e. the associative process to the exclusion of reality 
cues in the blot) and contamination (when the response determination as a single 
percept arises from merging two different things simultaneously).
Holt (1965), within an extension of Rapaport’s work, developed a multitude of 
score types, a hierarchical system corresponding to the characteristics of primary 
and secondary process thinking.
Johnston and Holzman (1976), continuing Holt’s work and the related im-
plications of object representation for normal thought organization, developed a 
“Thought Disorder Index”, a system of scoring primary process thinking.
Later, Athey continued this work towards a “Binary Multimodal Approach to 
Rorschach Thought Organization”, elaborating Rapaport’s description of the Ror-
schach response process as “co-wheeling of the progress of perceptual organization 
with the associative process” (Athey, 1986, p. 24). The model follows the con-
tinuum from primary process thinking to secondary process modes (observed from 
the developmental view) or, in the opposite direction, when following the idea to 
delineate normal, healthy forms of thought organization from pathological modes, 
stemming from the primary process unconscious material, both reflecting through 
the Rorschach response process. The modes of pathological thought organization 
reflect a disturbance in the normal articulation and integration of the subjective ex-
perience with objective reality.
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Through the developmental process towards healthy thought organization, the 
subjective experience and objective reality integrate through:
– restraint of the subjective associative process by the perceptual-representa-
tional realities through internalized external stimuli (in our case the realities 
of the Rorschach blot);
– enrichment and guidance of the perceptual differentiation-integrative reorga-
nization process.
Healthy thought organization is reflected through flexible moving and maintain-
ing an appropriate distance and closeness from perceptual reality, allowing some 
space for the subjective experience and the related associative process, without 
loss of reality control. Such a position may be followed by fabulation, concordant 
with the reality of the percept (e.g. Rorschach blot) and combination–construction 
of responses. The successful perceptual organization is followed by successful and 
creative associative embellishment reflecting the adaptive function of the ego. The 
emergence of associative or combinatory activity appears in the form of fantasy, 
but in a way which indicates simultaneous awareness of the departure from reality. 
The creative synthesis of the divergent fantasy and reality context demand some 
adaptive regression (or regression in the service of ego). Without it we may lose 
creativity to preserve reality control. On the other hand, what begins as adaptive 
regression may become pathological if the person’s representational processes are 
insufficiently autonomous and/or his or her unconscious repressed conflicts are too 
strong for a person to maintain an optimal distance and closeness from perceptual 
reality. The situation is followed by the loss of reality control to a certain degree.
The rigid position on the fusion at extreme closeness or extreme distance fol-
lowed by the loss of contact (boundary deficit) as well as shifting from one extreme 
to another, are the capital signs of pathological thought organization.
Primary process thought organization
“Primary process thinking is the organization of our feelings in thought which 
is dominated by the content, organization, and qualities of emotion (Marcus, 1992, 
p. 6). We can understand it as parallel to group organization according to Bion’s 
“basic assumptions” (Praper, 2008, 2013). The emotional background is completely 
unconscious while thoughts (through communication) may sometimes become pre-
conscious or even conscious.
Primary process thinking relies mostly upon images – as in dreams composed 
in a series of condensed images. Condensation is the fundamental principle of the 
primary process, the ability of the mind to form a complex representation of many 
related percepts, ideas and feelings. The experience gathered on the basis of the 
primary process (typical through the infantile period of development) has a pre-
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dominant relational meaning in which many generalized ideas are determined by the 
quantity and quality of emotions. Our responses driven by these (internal) mental 
representations are mostly the result of tropism and parts of the condensed content 
are easily displaced through projective identification.
Those aspects of the primary process are predominant in psychotic or near-
psychotic personalities. Not that we do not find these phenomena in normal persons. 
The difference lies in their flexible moving among primary and secondary process 
without losing the ability of reality control and contact.
Secondary process thought organization
Freud (1920) introduced the concept of the secondary process as the opposite of 
the primary process (1900) to denote thought orientation on the principle of reality 
and functionality including anticipation. He thought that this capacity developed 
later than the emotionally determined primary process under the influence of the 
socialization processes in the sphere of conflict and frustration. He was criticized 
using Hartmann’s argument that ego developed in the conflict-free sphere from the 
inborn cognitive dispositions or the so-called undifferentiated matrix representing 
the primary autonomy of the ego as developmental potential. The secondary process 
as mostly conscious, reality-oriented logical thinking develops since birth (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1958; Stern, 1985). However, autonomous apparatuses tend to be or-
ganized to the level of the secondary autonomous ego function through the process 
of differentiation, separation of the parts from the whole, and temporally sequential 
understanding of relations. These categories include both the functional boundaries 
and contacts in thinking (comprehension) as well as in interpersonal relationships.
The exploration of boundaries represents a vital part of diagnostic assessment 
on different levels.
Percept boundaries: The ego should be able to set a boundary to the percept so 
that it does not contaminate and is not contaminated by other mental events such 
as concept or affect.
In / out boundary: The percept consists of the inner, mental, sensory experiences 
of the stimuli; the ego should be able to differentiate between the inner representa-
tion and outer reality.
Concept boundaries: Conceptualization (through abstraction, generalization 
and application) should not be interchangeable with or flooded by the affect or ac-
tual percept.
Affect boundaries: Ego should be able to set boundaries to affects so that they do 
not flood the conscious percept, concept or other affects; one should be able to dif-
ferentiate between different affects and the actual affect from the generalized mood.
Conscious-preconscious-unconscious boundary: The ability to modulate and 
screen is the crucial boundary function of the ego; the mind should have the ability 
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to screen the continuous conscious sensory impressions from the outside, emotional 
reactions from the inside and conflicted emotions causing distress.
Primary process – Secondary process boundary: The ability to distinguish be-
tween emotionally determined thinking and fantasy; the reality-determined thinking 
should be maintained at the level of consciousness.
Self – other boundary: The ego development progress interlaced with the sep-
aration-individuation process as well as the attachment processes; the result is a 
transition from the fused, dedifferentiated experience to an autonomous position in 
relationships.
The intersubjective field is the playground and conflict sphere at the same time 
where mental representations are growing. To understand the development of a per-
sonality structure, either normal or pathological, we have to integrate Ego-psychology, 
Theory of object relation with Self-psychological concepts and Attachment theory.
Thought organization and object relations
Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek and Glick (1976) were among the first to offer an un-
derstanding of the relationship between object relations and thought organization 
seen through Rorschach. Rorschach scores, such as fabulized combination, con-
fabulation, contamination, were viewed as reflecting different intensities of “loss of 
boundary” between separate ideas. Such a loss of conceptual boundaries was seen as 
“a process that runs parallel, within the domain of thinking, to the progressive loss 
of boundary between self and other which may occur in regressive representation or 
experience of relationships” (Athey, 1986, p. 20). Thought organization and object 
relations are different sides of the same coin, although not always at the same level 
of regression or fixation.
Years ago (1991), in a presentation on the diagnostic relation, I took a risk with 
a statement on how our perception is in fact the reflection of our dynamic position 
towards a perceived object. Nowadays we should complete the statement: “… the 
reflection of our dynamic position and our internal object relation representations, 
as well as the relation to the objective and object world.”
The “boundary deficit hypothesis” may lead to differential diagnostic criteria 
in the field of pathological (in relation to normal) personality structure. Kernberg 
(1975) provides a structural model of “key object-relation states”. Associated with 
psychotic personality organization (as well as thought organization) we may find 
autistic pre-symbiotic unity or psychotic experience currently dominated by sym-
biotic merging, while those with borderline personality organization retain a strong 
interest in symbiotic relationships but have, at the same time, progressed to the point 
of conflicted separation-individuation, to a counter-dependent position. Neurotic 
personalities succeeded in establishing firmly differentiated and integrated experi-
ences of self and other, reflecting in the capacity for reality testing, though they may 
have many problems with conflicts and repressed basic needs.
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Primitive object-relation organization and boundary deficit between the self and 
other is not only parallel to boundary loss in the field of cognition. Both interact in 
an active relation. Recent findings do not support the idea of unitary dimensions or 
clean developmental lines in the field of separation-individuation or in the progress 
from primary to secondary thinking processes. There are other cue mechanisms. 
Urist (1980) underlined two of them: the pathological use of condensation and 
displacement is probably on the brink of regression to the pathological modes of 
the primary process. However, the boundary deficit between the self and other may 
appear without a parallel cognitive regression to a level of condensation (which is 
typical for borderline personalities), while pathological thought organization seems 
to inevitably involve the loss of boundary between the self and other at the same 
time, typical of psychotic personalities.
Healthy or pathological modes of thought organization are at the same time a 
healthy or pathological organizer of the relations between the self and other as well 
as between subjective and objective reality.
Recent research data and differential diagnostic assessment
During the last three decades we witnessed a strong cross-fertilization of medi-
cal sciences, psychology, philosophy, neuro- and cognitive sciences. The results 
support the idea of a relationship between the attachment processes and the devel-
opment of the capacity to envision mental states in the self and others as a men-
talization in the sense of reflective function (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target, 
2002). The concept of mentalization in combination with the models of Theory 
of mind (developed in psychology and philosophy) has an important value attrib-
uted to explaining a person’s behavior. Numerous research data support the clinical 
experience with regard to the interconnected factors of the borderline personality 
disorder, such as: disorganized attachment, impaired reflective function and distor-
tions in mentalization, resulting in deficient self and other representations as well 
as in relationships.
The results of research in neuro- and cognitive sciences indicate that psycho-
logical patterns are at the same time patterns of neurological organization and vice 
versa. We are referring to two-way influences and brain plasticity. Early relation-
ships are grounded in the right-brain as implicit memory - defining dimensions 
of empathy, trust and attachment in later relationships. Simultaneously with these 
psychological processes, stimulated in the atmosphere of emotional attunement, the 
maturation of the right-brain is being stimulated, which supports the social cogni-
tion (Schore, 2012).
Analytical psychotherapists can conduct the diagnostic phase by means of the 
initial interview and some projective tests. Perhaps the advantage of the interview is 
valid to better detect the starting points of the therapeutic process, while the assess-
ment is taking place throughout the therapeutic process. On the other hand, when 
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there is a question of selection, we may not want to engage long initial interviews 
as the starting points. The advantage of using projective tests lies in the clinical 
experience where the client is much less dependent on interaction details of the 
patient-examiner relationship, which makes the Rorschach both economical and 
ethical in actual clinical practice. The client’s transference contents are exposed in 
relation to the test (not the examiner), while, at the same time, the client’s potential 
to restore the therapeutic working alliance may also be revealed. However, the di-
agnostic phase has many practical advantages – it enables the initial understanding 
of a patient’s personality supporting decision making about the indications as well 
as revealing the starting points of the therapeutic process.
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EGO-PSIHOLOŠKI POKAZATELJI  
DIFERENCIJALNE DIJAGNOZE 
 IZMEĐU GRANIČNE I PSIHOTIČNE LIČNOSTI
Sažetak
Pitanje dijagnostičkog stadija i dalje je relevantno u kliničkoj psihoanalizi i psi-
hoanalitičkim psihoterapijama. Dijagnostička procjena nije bila od primarne važnosti 
u klasičnoj psihoanalizi. Psihoanalitičar je jednostavno uključio analitičke metode i 
tehnike u svoju kliničku praksu kako bi utvrdio pogodnost pacijenta za analizu. Prvi 
odlučujući razvojni poticaj specifične psihoanalitičke dijagnostičke procjene slijedio 
je pomak prema odnosnim teorijama i kliničkoj praksi s pacijentima s graničnim po-
remećajima. Psihijatrijski intervju koji je uveo Harry Stack Sullivan (1954) otkrio 
je potrebu za specifičnom psihoanalitičkom procjenom. Sljedeći je korak bio razvoj 
Hartmanove ego-psihologije. Ego (regulacijski mehanizam između stvarnosti i oso-
be), uključuje procese regulacije i organizacije iskustava koji su relevantni za razu-
mijevanje bliskopsihotične i psihotične ličnosti. Taj način istraživanja omogućava di-
ferencijalni opis interpretativne psihodimanike i razvoj procjene, uključujući kriterije 
pokazatelja i prognoze.
Ključne riječi: Rorschachove mrlje, ego-psihologija, diferencijalna dijagnoza, gra-
nični poremećaj
